Editorial: To Use or Not To? Embedded Systems for Voting
Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) are a very commonly discussed example of an embedded computing system, which have been at the center of a political storm in India in recent days. A number of allegations have surfaced that EVMs are being reprogrammed or tampered with during elections to favor candidates of a specific political party. Given that EVMs are very classical embedded systems with simple microcontrollers whose program instructions are burnt into a ROM, and cast vote counts are stored in an EPROM, and few peripherals, one would think that it would be easy to verify by experts to indubitably establish their tamper-proof design and implementations. However, looking at various aspects of this simple yet very critical embedded system, it seems a lot more research is required on multiple aspects of the democratic franchise that are dispensed through these simple systems.
Before coming to the Indian case, let me focus on some other countries. In the Netherlands, EVMs were abandoned in 2007 after several years of controversy regarding the security of the voting data, the machines, as well as the privacy of the voter. The engagement of civil society, computer experts, and others paved the way to experimentation that showed the ease with which one can replace the memory chips in those machines in less than 5 minutes, allowing manipulation, thereby possibly subverting democracy. More concerning was the fact that with simple radio receivers, people could see variations in radio signals that would allow one to detect whom a voter is casting the vote for-from outside the polling station. After some alterations in the design, other such side channel attacks were found in certain versions of the machine, and eventually honoring the fact that integrity of the democratic process is more sacrosanct than efficiency, the Netherlands abandoned electronic voting 1 .
In 2009, the federal constitutional court of Germany ruled that electronic voting is unconstitutional 2 . The court ruled "The use of Nedap electronic voting machines violated the principle of the public nature of elections (Article 38 in conjunction with Article 20.1 and 20.2 of the Basic Law) that requires that all essential steps in the elections are subject to public examinability unless other constitutional interests justify an exception." This is very significant. Given that the legitimacy of democratic processes depends on the public's trust in the processes, any member of the public should be able to examine, if he/she desires so, to test and verify every step-including the functioning of the voting machines, their design, the security and safety, safeguards, and measures to secure their franchise. If the voting machine design, software, or the security proofs are not possible to verify by members of the public, there is enough reason to worry about safeguarding our democracy. Ireland also abandoned electronic voting in 2004.
In the United States, 27 states are using EVMs, of which 15 are using a verifiable audit trail. However, given the issues surrounding the hacking incidents during the last presidential election in the United States, there is reasonable doubt whether it is prudent to continue the electronic machine-based voting.
Coming back to the Indian case, the voting machines are quite simple, with a ballot unit, a control unit, display unit, and the wires connecting them. While the software is kept under extreme 58:2 S. K. Shukla confidentiality with the government sector companies who manufacture these machines, the machine instructions are burnt into a ROM with the claim that it cannot be changed. The microcontroller being used is simple, and the memory units are connected with simple protocol.
In 2010, a group of security experts got hold of a unit and showed that there are numerous ways to tamper with these machines within a matter of a few minutes 3 . One can replace the microcontroller, the memory units, and even the PC board with relative ease, provided physical access is possible. Also, if the EPROM is replaced with an attacker's chosen instructions, the behavior of the machine could be changed, including how it responds to a pre-poll mock polling phase vs. real polling phase. Further, the display unit can be replaced, and clip-on radio frequency devices may be used to control the behavior of the programs. Of course, the Indian authorities now have responded by adding mutual authentication between the components, and also doing some redesign. However, given the cloak of secrecy about the design, the program, and even the mechanisms of authentication, security by obscurity seems to be their goal.
Another defense is that the EVMs are very well protected during their storage, transfer, and randomized methods for allocating them to polling booths. Unfortunately, given the large population, and various uncertainties during a nationwide polling process, many of these safeguards might be violated if properly orchestrated. If none of these happen, even then, due to the fact that all the steps associated with the EVM design, manufacturing, and security studies are not subject to the verification and testing by the common people and experts, there is a scope of doubt about the security of the entire process. With the current advances in data science and exfiltration of personal data, as exemplified in the Cambridge Analytica/Facebook case, it is not inconceivable that data analytics can pinpoint exactly which polling stations need to be tampered with, leaving the rest as it is-and still manipulate the outcomes of the election.
As embedded systems researchers, it seems to be incumbent on us to figure out systems whose safety and security can be verified by anyone, while secure enough without the need for obscurity/ secrecy of the algorithms, designs, methods, and so on. That is the only way EVMs can be made acceptable to a democratic nation. Creating a cloak of secrecy to protect from tampering never works-all security researchers would agree. This is an important need that the embedded systems community can attempt to cater to and, at the same time, save the democratic election process in every democratic jurisdiction. If experts can show to anyone interested the risk, the potential attack surfaces, the side channel vulnerabilities, and make every bit of software/firmware, architecture, and protocol open, and check the plausibility of exploitations that still may remain in the fully vetted system, that will put the population at ease regarding their enfranchisement-even with systems they do not fully understand.
I, therefore, request all readers to think about this problem, and possibly even propose a special issue on designing transparent and open EVMs and their risk analysis.
Finally, I am happy to introduce the third issue of Volume 17. Volume 17:3, for a change, is not featuring any special sections, and all the articles in this issue are either regular articles, or articles from a past special issue submission that did not make it in time for the publication of the corresponding issue. Editor-in-Chief
